Using detailed data on control chains of 710 European commercial banks, we test whether the presence of some categories of controlling shareholders affects product diversification performance. We find that when banks have no controlling shareholder or have only family and state shareholders activity diversification yields diseconomies. However, as long as the control chain involves banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies or any other combination of these shareholder categories, banks benefit from diversification economies: they display higher profitability, lower earnings volatility and lower default risk. This is potentially because such categories of shareholders bring additional skills to manage diverse activities. A further exploration shows that such mitigating roles are greater for domestic and diversified shareholders. Our findings provide insights on why banks suffer from greater activity diversification and have several policy implications.
Introduction
The question of whether policy makers should restrict banking activities or allow banks to engage in diverse activities is still a debatable policy issue. Although the effect of greater activity diversification (i.e., a combination of traditional and nontraditional activities) on banks' performance (profitability and risk) is well addressed in the literature, there is no consensus thus far, with evidence showing the presence of economies and diseconomies of diversification. These inconclusive findings cry out for a further investigation to learn why banks suffer or benefit from their diversification strategy. The objective of this paper is therefore to test whether diversification performance depends on the bank's organizational aspect, and especially its ownership structure. More specifically, we test whether banks involving in their ownership structures shareholders with prior experience in managing a variety of activities are better able to reap benefits of activity diversification.
In some countries -such as in Europe-banks and firms are not stand-alone but, rather, they belong to a group of firms linked via strong shareholding relationships. In such ownership settings, a shareholder achieves the control of a specific bank through a large number of intermediate corporations: a shareholder directly controls a firm, which in turn controls another firm, which might itself control another firm, and so forth.
1 Within these multilayer ownership structures, several shareholders of different categories are involved in the bank's decision making: banking institutions, institutional investors (mutual funds, financial companies and insurance companies), industrial companies, families and so forth. This set of shareholders could actually provide the bank an initial exposure and background and therefore sufficient ability and expertise to easily diversify. For instance, institutional investors are known to have prior experience in loans syndication (Lim et al., 2014) , securities and insurance underwriting, brokerage and mutual fund activities and, as a consequence, they are able to deliver additional skills and expertise allowing the bank to reap benefits accruing from activity diversification.
More precisely, in this paper we assume that some categories of controlling shareholders, like institutional investors, banking institutions and industrial companies could be a source of advanced techniques, expertise and knowledge allowing banks to manage diverse activities where they potentially lack experience. Hence, banks with a significant presence of these 3 shareholder categories could diversify more promptly than widely-held banks (i.e., banks with no controlling shareholder) and enjoy economies of activity diversification.
To investigate the role of certain shareholder categories in mitigating diseconomies of diversification, we use a hand-collected data on multilayer ownership structures (i.e., control chains) of 710 commercial banks based in 17 Western European countries where the presence of multilayer ownership structures is more important than in other Western countries. We identify all shareholders involved in the bank's control chain and classify them into five categories: banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies, families and states. We then test whether the presence of some of these controlling shareholders could shape diversification performance by potentially affecting banks' expertise in managing their activities over the 2002-2010 period. Banks can diversify into new non-interest or interest income products or to services that are directly linked to an existing activity. Banks can also diversify within either non-interest income or interest income generating activities. We hence consider banks' activity diversification that occur either through shifts between non-interest income and interest income generating activities or through diversification within non-interest income generating activities. We capture banks' performance using profitability, earnings volatility and insolvency measures based on accounting data but also on market data.
We find that diversification performance differs according to the categories of shareholders involved in the bank's control chain. More precisely, the results show that activity diversification is associated with higher earnings volatility and higher default risk when banks are widely-held or have only families and states as controlling shareholders. This is possibly because families and states lack experience to manage diverse activities and, as a consequence, they are unable to deliver skills to their banks to allow for a successful activity diversification. However, banks involving as controlling shareholders other banking institutions, institutional investors and industrial companies benefit from diversification economies, meaning that they enjoy higher profitability and exhibit lower earnings volatility and insolvency. Consistent with our conjecture, these results suggest that, unlike family and state owners, the presence of institutional investors, banking institutions as well as industrial companies in banks' control chains is a source of additional skills and expertise allowing banks to reap the benefits from more diverse activities.
We also take our investigation further and examine whether the effectiveness of these controlling shareholders in mitigating diseconomies of diversification is more or less pronounced under particular conditions. Consistent with the home field advantage view (e.g., Lensink and Naaborg, 2007) , we find that the observed mitigating roles are greater for domestic owners than for foreign ones. The results also show that, as long as the bank is controlled by a single ultimate owner, intermediate controlling shareholders are effective in mitigating diseconomies of diversification regardless of the extent of their financial interests held in the bank. This is consistent with our conjecture that an ultimate owner, when she/he is the only one who lastly benefit from a successful diversification, should have greater incentives to encourage intermediate shareholders to cooperate and transmit their skills to banks. Moreover, the results show that diversified owners are more efficient in mitigating diseconomies of diversification. Finally, we find that, although both large and small banks benefit from the presence of those shareholders, diversification benefits are greater for small banks. This is consistent with the view that small banks may suffer more from the lack of expertise to manage diverse activities (e.g., Mercieca et al., 2007) and, as a consequence, they should benefit more from the technology transmitted by controlling shareholders.
This study contributes to the literature in three directions. Firstly, our paper builds a bridge between the bank's organizational aspect and diversification performance within complex shareholding relationships by analyzing whether banks controlled by certain categories of shareholders are better able to benefit from their diversification strategy. Secondly, our study uses a broader dataset on multilayer ownership structures and adds to the literature by constructing several ownership indicators. Thirdly, our paper focuses on why banks suffer or benefit from their diversification strategy and sheds light on the fact that diseconomies of diversification in European banks come, at least partially, from the lack of expertise in managing diverse activities. From a policy perspective, this finding may be of help in the discussion of policy recommendations with regards to more stringent activity restrictions in European countries (IMF, 2011; ICB, 2011; Liikanen, 2012) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and Section 3 presents the data and the model. In Section 4, we present the sample characteristics and some univariate analyses. Section 5 discusses the regression results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related literature and hypotheses development
Over the last three decades, banks have expanded their income sources by undertaking non-interest income generating activities such as securities and insurance underwriting, brokerage and mutual fund services, venture capital and asset securitization. The existing 5 literature testing the implications of activity diversification on banks' profitability and risk provides inconclusive findings.
Most studies dedicated to the U.S. banking industry find that greater involvement in noninterest activities leads to higher profitability but also to higher risk because of the increased volatility of these activities. For instance, DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004) , and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that a shift towards non-interest activities worsens the riskreturn trade-off. In a recent study, DeYoung and Torna (2013) find that expansion to nontraditional activities affected the probability of U.S. banks failure during the financial crisis and that this effect depends on banks' financial conditions. Specifically, they show that higher involvement in nontraditional activities is associated with higher probability of failure for financially distressed banks and the opposite is the case for healthy banks. Conversely, some U.S. based studies show that banks have potential benefits to expand the scope of their activities. For instance, Gallo et al. (1996) Meslier et al. (2014) find that income diversification improves profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. Such diversification economies are significantly stronger for foreign banks than domestic ones.
In this paper, we aim to test whether banks controlled by certain categories of shareholders are better able to reap benefits of activity diversification than banks with dispersed ownership (i.e., widely-held banks).
Some categories of shareholders have expertise in managing various activities and could bring additional experience, allowing the bank to easily diversify. For instance, institutional investors are generally larger, hold sufficiently diversified portfolios and have expertise in processing information at a lower cost (Pound, 1988) . Institutional investors are also generally involved in term and riskier syndicated loans (Lim et al., 2014) and therefore have a habit to manage riskier activities. Moreover, as suggested by some earlier works (e.g., Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992) , banking institutions acquire valuable information about clients during the process of making loans that facilitates the efficient provision of other financial services such as the underwriting of securities, and vice versa. Similarly, industrial companies might hold sufficiently diversified asset portfolios (Barry et al., 2011) . As major shareholders in some countries (like in Europe), industrial companies could also play an important role in governing banks and acquiring valuable information. Taken together, these arguments suggest that, as controlling shareholders, banking institutions, institutional investors and industrial companies can transmit the acquired information to their banks to manage diverse activities where the latter potentially lack experience. We hence test the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. A shift from dispersed ownership to these categories of shareholders (i.e., banks, institutional investors and industrial companies) or any combination of these should improve the diversification performance.
In contrast, other shareholders (like families) limit executive management positions to family members which might restrict labor pool to obtain qualified talent. Families and states could also see innovation and openness as potential threats to their control and might be reluctant to finance innovations (Morck et al., 2000) . This suggests that compared to the remaining categories of shareholders, family and state shareholders might be less effective in delivering managerial expertise beyond the existing one. Hence, we also test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. A shift from dispersed ownership to family or state ownership may not result in a more successful diversification strategy.
Data and model
Before presenting the empirical model and the set of variables, we describe the sample.
Sample
Our sample contains commercial banks established in 17 Western European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The sample period is from 2002 to 2010. We obtain bank accounting data from Bankscope.
We mostly use unconsolidated data if available, otherwise we employ consolidated data. We check the robustness of the results using only unconsolidated data. To retrieve ownership data, we use both Bankscope and Amadeus databases as key sources, but also the annual reports disclosed in the websites. We collect macroeconomic data from the Bloomberg database. To be able to correctly calculate rolling-window standard deviations of our risk indicators, we restrict the initial sample to banks for which we have detailed information on the main financial variables for at least three years of time series observations. We mitigate the impact of outliers by winsorizing the main financial variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
This gives rise to a final sample of 4,615 annual observations corresponding to 710 commercial banks, 105 of which are listed banks (see Table 1 for a classification of these banks by country). We now turn to the description of the main variables introduced in our regressions (see Table 2 for summary statistics and more details on these variables).
Measuring ownership structure
To identify all shareholders involved in the bank's decision making, we first need to build indirect control chains of the sampled banks until we achieve their ultimate controlling owners. We also use the control chains to assess control rights (i.e., the right to control) and cash- The incentives of controlling shareholders to transmit their skills to the bank to easily diversify may increase with the extent of their financial interests in the bank. To capture such 11 incentives, we compute an ownership indicator CFRConcentration which takes into account the level and the dispersion of financial interests among all shareholders in the control chain:
where, CFR i and SDCFR i are respectively the average and the standard deviation of cash-flow rights held by all the shareholders involved in the control chain of bank i. Moreover, the ability of a shareholder to transmit skills and to influence the bank's decision making might also matter. We hence follow the same procedure and compute another
indicator CRConcentration based on the control rights of all shareholders. 5 Higher values of CRConcentration indicate higher ability of shareholders to transfer their skills, if any, to the bank and to influence its decision making. 21.66%. CR s . CRConcentration is then computed as:
21.66% (1 -0.11) = 19.28%.
[Insert Fig.1 about here]
Performance, product diversification and control variables
We use various accounting-based indicators to assess bank performance (profitability and risk). We measure profitability for each bank using the return on assets computed as the ratio of net income to total assets (ROA). We use the return on assets rather than the return on equity (ROE) in order not to have our main results contaminated by differences in the leverage ratio. As a measure of bank risk-taking, we use the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA) which we compute on a rolling-window of three years ([t-2, t]), but also on a rolling-window of five years ([t-4, t]) for robustness considerations. Higher values of SDROA indicate higher risk-taking. We also compute a risk-adjusted profitability measure (RAROA) which we define as the ratio of the return on assets to its three-year rolling-window standard deviation. Finally, we consider a measure of default risk for each bank by computing the Z-Score (ZScore) following Boyd and Graham (1986) as: ZScore = (ROA+ Equity)/SDROA, where Equity is the ratio of total equity to total assets. Lower values of both RAROA and ZScore denote respectively a higher risk and a higher probability of failure.
6
We capture the degree of product diversification using bank income structure. Ideally, we would like a detailed breakdown on bank income and data on the extent to which banks underwrite securities, operate mutual funds, securitize assets, provide brokerage services, and so on. These details allow us to accurately test the effect of the presence of some categories of shareholders in the control chain on diversification performance. Data availability, however, restricts our ability to measure the diversification of activities for both publicly-listed and privately-owned banks. Given this data constraint, we use two diversification measures. The first measure referred to as Income Diversity captures the degree of diversification between interest and non-interest generating activities:
6 Besides the use of accounting performance measures, to check the robustness of the results we also compute several marketbased indicators for the subsample of 105 publicly-listed banks. We consider a profitability measure (Return) defined as the average of daily bank stock returns for a calendar year. Risk-taking is defined as the standard deviation of daily bank stock returns for a calendar year (SDReturn). We measure default risk using two indicators: (i) a market data based ZScore defined as:
, where Return and SDReturn are in percentages and (ii) the Merton's distance to default (DD). We compute the Merton's distance to default using both accounting and market variables: (i) debt of one year maturity which we interpolate using the cubic spline method to get daily observations, (ii) daily market value of equity and (iii) the three-month interbank risk-free rate. The estimation results obtained using market-based measures, not reported here but available on request, lead to similar conclusions. 
where, Net Noninterest Income is the sum of Fee Income (fee and commission income) and Trading Income (trading income and other non-interest income). By construction, both measures range between zero and a half. Income Diversity (Noninterest Income Diversity) is equal to zero when diversification reaches its minimum, meaning that net operating income (net non-interest income) stem entirely either from interest based activities (fee/commission generating activities) or from non-interest based activities (trading activities). They are equal to a half when there is a complete diversification. 8 We introduce in the regressions a set of control variables that are highlighted by the existing literature to affect bank performance: the divergence between control and cash-flow rights (ExcessControl) defined as the difference between aggregate control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner (i.e., the one with the highest aggregate control rights); the natural logarithm of bank total assets [Log(Assets)] to account for bank size; the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity) to control for bank capitalization; the ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits) to account for the funding structure; the ratio of loans to total assets (Loans) to control for the bank business model; a dummy variable d(Listed) to account for the public and private status of banks; and finally the growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDPGrowth) to take into account differences in the macroeconomic environment.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Sample characteristics and univariate analyses
We first present the ownership characteristics of the sample banks. Then, we look into the diversification performance of banks classified according to the categories of shareholders they involve in their control chains. 
Ownership characteristics of banks in Western Europe
Our dataset indicates that around 13% of the observations relate to widely-held banks and 87% to banks that are controlled by at least one shareholder. The number of shareholders involved in the control chains of banks ranges from one to 64. Among controlled banks, more than 90% of the observations relate to banks with at least two shareholders in their control chains. 10 We report in 
Ownership structure, product diversification and performance
We first examine whether banks with different categories of shareholders exhibit differences in the extent to which they are diversified. The results (not tabulated) show that banks in the sample are relatively diversified among interest and non-interest activities but focused within the range of non-interest activities: most of non-interest income comes from commissions and fee-based activities rather than from trading activities. The data also show that the degree of bank diversification is not significantly different among all groups of banks classified according to the categories of shareholders. These sample characteristics allow us to correctly test our hypotheses.
We then analyze whether the diversification performance differs depending on the composition of the banks control chains. On the whole, considering the Income Diversity measure, the results in Table 4 show that unlike for other banks, activity diversification is associated with higher profitability and lower risk when banks involve institutional investors, banking institutions, and industrial companies as shareholders in their control chains. A possible explanation could be the involvement of those powerful shareholders with prior experience in managing a variety of activities and their strong association with better financial networks and partnerships. The results obtained using the Noninterest Income Diversity measure (not reported in Table 4) show almost similar characteristics.
Econometric results
In this section, we first examine whether banks benefit or suffer from their diversification strategy regardless of their ownership structure. We then analyze whether banks controlled by certain categories of shareholders are better able to reap the benefits of diversification than widely-held banks. We finally look more closely into the factors that might affect the effectiveness of such controlling shareholders in mitigating diseconomies of diversification.
We use the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
Product diversification performance: baseline results
As explained before, the literature highlights that activity diversification does not necessarily imply higher profitability and lower risk, but may on the contrary induce diseconomies. Therefore, as a first check we test the effect of activity diversification on banks' performance regardless of their ownership structure to shed light on whether European banks benefit or suffer from their diversification strategy. Table 5 reports the obtained results using income (Panel 1) and non-interest income (Panel 2) diversity measures. We find that both diversity measures are associated with higher profitability but also with higher risktaking and higher default risk, and this holds in almost all the regressions: the coefficient on the diversity measure is significant and positive for the profitability (ROA) and the risk-taking (SDROA) proxies and negative for the default risk proxy (ZScore). Furthermore, the results indicate that the benefits accruing from activity diversification (i.e., the positive effect on profitability) do not outweigh the increase in earnings volatility (SDROA): the coefficient associated to the diversity measure is not significant in the regression where the dependent variable is risk-adjusted profitability (RAROA).
While these findings challenge the traditional intermediation theory (Diamond, 1984) which suggests that diversification reduces risk, they are aligned with the findings of some earlier works indicating that diversification gives rise to diseconomies. For instance, Laeven and Levine (2007) explain the diseconomies of diversification by agency problems between managers and shareholders. Other studies highlight that the diseconomies of diversification could be due to the fact that banks have less experience to manage diverse activities and this ultimately harms performance, reflected in more volatile earnings and higher insolvency risk (e.g., Mercieca et al., 2007) . In any case, taken together, our results imply that banks in Europe suffer diversification diseconomies (i.e., higher risk).
Regarding control variables, some of them enter significant. Consistent with the expropriation effect (e.g., Azofra and Santamaria 2011, Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015) we find that the divergence between control and cash-flow rights (ExcessControl) is associated with lower profitability, higher risk-taking and higher default risk. However, the dummy variables included to account for the types of shareholders in the control chain are generally non-significant. The results also show that large banks are more profitable (higher ROA) than small banks but they also display a higher probability of failure (lower ZScore). In addition, better capitalized banks are more profitable (higher ROA) and less vulnerable (higher ZScore) but more risky (higher SDROA). Moreover, the results show that banks with larger deposit base are more profitable and exhibit a higher probability of failure. In contrast, banks more reliant on lending activities are less risky. Finally, the results show that the annual growth rate of the gross domestic product is positively related to profitability and negatively to risk.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
If the observed diseconomies of diversification (higher risk) are due, at least partially, to the lack of expertise of European banks to manage diverse activities, the presence of controlling shareholders with prior experience in managing some activities could help to mitigate such diseconomies. Our objective in the next subsection is therefore to test whether European banks controlled by certain categories of shareholders are better able to extract the benefits of activity diversification. [Insert Table 6 about here]
Ownership structure and banks' diversification performance
On the whole, our results suggest that the effect of activity diversification on performance depends on the presence and absence of some shareholder categories in the control chain to which the bank belongs. More precisely, banks suffer diseconomies of diversification (i.e., higher risk) when they are widely-held or when their control chains include family and/or state owners solely. However, when control chains involve banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies or any other combination of these categories of controlling shareholders, banks benefit from diversification economies (higher profitability, lower earnings volatility and lower default risk). These results are consistent with the expertise of institutional investors, banking institutions and industrial companies in managing some activities, which if, transferred to the bank can translate into better diversification performance.
Ownership structure and banks' diversification performance: deeper investigations
In this subsection, we go further by analyzing some factors that could reinforce or weaken the effectiveness of controlling owners in mitigating diseconomies of activity diversification.
We consider bank level factors as well as shareholder level factors. For this purpose, we 
Bank level factors
First, we test whether the incentives of controlling shareholders to transmit information and skills to the bank to easily diversify increase with the concentration of their financial interests held in that bank. Second, because the ultimate owner is the one who will lastly reap the benefits of a successful diversification -especially from profit diversion-, she/he may have greater incentives to encourage intermediate shareholders to cooperate and transmit their skills to the bank. Hence, the mitigating roles played by controlling shareholders should be greater in the case of a single ultimate owner than in the presence of multiple ultimate owners.
Third, small banks may suffer more from the lack of expertise to manage diverse activities (e.g., Mercieca et al., 2007) and, as a consequence, they should benefit more from the technology transmitted by controlling shareholders than large banks.
To capture such effects, we define three dummy variables. We differentiate banks with high and low ownership concentration and define a dummy variable d(CFRConcentration)
which takes a value of one if the variable CFRConcentration is greater than the median value.
To capture the effect of the multiplicity of ultimate owners and the effect of bank size, we define two dummy variables, d(Single) and d(Small), which, respectively, take a value of one if the bank is controlled by one ultimate owner and if the bank's total assets variable is below the median value. The results in Table 7 show that the presence of institutional investors, banking institutions and industrial companies is beneficial only when the bank is controlled by a single ultimate owner and that these benefits are present regardless of the degree of ownership concentration/dispersion within control chains. 13 Coherently, the results also show that even though both large and small banks benefit from the presence of these controlling shareholders, the benefits are stronger for small banks.
[Insert Table 7 about here] The results reported in Table 8 show that both domestic and foreign owners contribute to mitigate diseconomies of diversification but such mitigating roles are higher for domestic owners, consistent with the home field advantage view. 14 Coherently, the results also show that publicly-listed owners are more efficient in mitigating diseconomies of diversification than privately-owned shareholders.
Shareholder level factors
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Conclusion
The objective of this study is to empirically investigate whether banks controlled by certain categories of shareholders are better able to benefit from their diversification strategy. 14 Similarly, Claessens et al. (2001) investigate performance differences between domestic and foreign banks in developed and developing countries. They find that domestic banks have higher profits than foreign banks in developed countries and the opposite is the case in developing countries. This might explain why our results obtained on developed countries do not corroborate those obtained by prior studies which focus on emerging countries (e.g., Berger et al., 2010; Pennathur et al., 2012) . As an additional analysis, we would like to differentiate European and Non-European foreign owners and test whether the former are more effective in mitigating diseconomies of diversification. However, a deeper look to the data shows that most of foreign owners come from European countries. This table reports the performance (profitability and risk) of the sample banks according to the composition of their control chains and their degree of diversification over the 2002-2010 period. Using a control threshold of 10%, we differentiate widely-held banks and controlled banks. d(Widely) is a dummy equal to one if the bank is widely-held (with no controlling shareholder), and zero otherwise. We classify the controlling shareholders involved in control chains into five categories: a bank (Bank); a financial company, an insurance company, a mutual or a pension fund (Institutional); an industrial firm (Industry); an individual, a family or a manager (Family); a state or a public authority (State). d(Bank), d(Institutional), d(Industry), d(Family), and d(State) are dummies equal to one if at least one shareholder of the corresponding category is present in the bank's control chain, and zero otherwise. We divide each group of banks into diversified and nondiversified banks. We consider as diversified (Diversified), banks with an above-median value of the Income Diversity measure and as non-diversified (Nondiversified), banks with a below-median value of the Income Diversity measure. ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by total assets. SDROA is the three-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on assets. RAROA is the return on assets divided by its three-year rolling-window standard deviation. ZScore is a measure of bank default risk. T-statistics test for the null: "profitability and risk are not different between non-diversified and diversified banks inside each group". *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test. . We measure product diversification using income (Panel 1) and non-interest income (Panel 2) diversity measures. ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by total assets. SDROA is the three-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on assets. RAROA is the return on assets divided by its three-year rolling-window standard deviation. Table 2 . In all the regressions, Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions under the null of the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. AR2 test is a test of the absence of second order residual autocorrelation. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 0.009** -0.010** 5.410** 14.070** 0.007** -0.007** 5.566** 12.481** Table 7 Ownership structure and diversification performance: effect of ownership concentration, multiplicity of ultimate owners and bank size ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by total assets. SDROA is the threeyear rolling-window standard deviation of the return on assets. RAROA is the return on assets divided by its three-year rolling-window standard deviation. ZScore is a measure of bank default risk. We measure product diversification using Income Diversity defined as 1- SDROA is the three-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on assets. RAROA is the return on assets divided by its three-year rolling-window standard deviation.
ZScore is a measure of bank default risk. We measure product diversification using Income Diversity defined as 1- 0.010** -0.011** 9.710** 16.946** 0.011** -0.014** 9.535** 15.544***
